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I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional Framers anticipated many of the problems
that our society might encounter with a powerful government, but the
expansion of the administrative state seemed to have eluded them.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
College of Law; J.D. Florida State University, 1997.
1. Agencies can be traced to the pre-civil war era, with the Treasury Department's
regulation in 1864 establishing the "freedmen's home colonies" (also called the
Freedmen's Bureau) to provide employment, food, clothing, and welfare assistance to
freed slaves. President Roosevelt later used the notion of administrative agencies in his
New Deal programs in order to counteract the Great Depression. Even though many of
these agencies were later abolished, the concept of utilizing agency authority was
thereafter given serious consideration. See The National Archives, Records of Civil War
Special Agencies of the Treasury Department of 1864, 366.1-366.6,
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/366.html (last visited Feb. 18,
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With the increased tendency toward governmental oversight in
modern society, Congress deemed it fit to delegate some of its
lawmaking authority to the other branches of government.2 While this
action has effectuated the promulgation of regulations and resolution
of disputes through adjudicatory proceedings, the area of
administrative law continues to be challenging, especially where it
poses concerns regarding an individual's basic rights.' To avoid the
slow erosion of our fundamental constitutional rights as they pertain
to our system of administration, it is crucial to develop an
understanding of the dynamics of administrative law.4
The purpose of an agency's regulation is derived from its
underlying authority as it relates to a public policy concern, which is
designated by the legislature.! Most often, however, individual rights
become interpreted in an attenuated manner in favor of legislative
2010); see generally Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2. See Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1928).
3. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Berzon, J., dissenting).
Aside from the supposed identity of rights and private causes of action, the
majority rests its contrary categorical assertion that "agency regulations
cannot independently create rights," . . . on its view of the role of
administrative agencies. That view flies in the face of seventy years of
administrative law jurisprudence. Applying contemporary administrative law
principles rather than antiquated ones, I can see no reason why valid agency
regulations cannot create individual rights and do so independently of
specific Congressional intent regarding the rights created.
Id. at 954 (quoting id. at 939)
4. Individuals should understand their due process rights in order to protect these
rights. For example,
[m]inimum due process requires that before an individual may be deprived
of property he be given notice and an opportunity for a hearing. The notice
must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. The question is not whether a
particular individual failed to understand the notice but whether the notice is
reasonably calculated to apprise intended recipients, as a whole, of their
rights.
Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 876 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) (citations omitted).
5. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
[A]n administrative agency's power to regulate in the public interest must
always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress. And "[i]n
our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public,
we must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point
where Congress indicated it would stop."
Id. (quoting 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951)).
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regulatory policy concerns. For example, in the pursuit of a
regulatory infraction, an individual's right to remain silent may be
subverted,' or criminal actions may be scrutinized without concerns
regarding double jeopardy. Arguably, the explanations for this may
simply be a matter of perspective, that the agency is bringing an action
against licensure and not the individual,' or that it is regulating a
pervasive industry practice which requires balancing the individual's
rights with the agency's action.'o The interpretation of certain
constitutional liberties has, however, unbalanced the interest of the
individual with that of government."
Currently, as the government seeks to provide financial assistance
to the marketplace, its action will likely result in increases to
regulation and oversight in an attempt to avoid a recurrence of the
2008 recession. Arguably, as it continues to exercise its authority
under the umbrella of an administrative state, the government could
potentially limit some fundamental rights to the extent that
rectification becomes too complex or difficult.
This Article will focus discussion on some fundamental issues
relating to the administrative process and explore the ramifications on
the individual. The importance for such analytical discourse finds
support in the historical increase of regulations and the individual
citizen's lack of awareness of the potential regulatory consequences.
Hence, an exploration of administrative issues should begin with an
understanding of this delegated authority and the unique entity it
empowers.
6. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 496 (1953).
Federal law has largely developed and expanded as public law in this latter
sense. It consists of substituting federal statute law applied by administrative
procedures in the public interest in the place of individual suits in courts to
enforce common-law doctrines of private right. This evolution, sharply
contested, and presenting many problems, has taken place in many other
fields as well ....
Id.
7. See Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 781 F.2d 1573, 1578 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1986).
8. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95-96, 105 (1997).
9. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 419 (1942).
10. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700-02 (1987).
11. Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("When the
executive or the administrative process abridges constitutional rights, it is subject to closer
scrutiny than otherwise, and ultimately it is the court rather than the agency that must
balance the competing interests.").
2009] 371
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: DELEGATED POWER FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC
The administrative agencyl2 is a unique entity due to its inherent
powers and the somewhat ambiguous nature that its powers engender
for the benefit of the public." While this is not always the case, the
assumption is that policy makers contemplated a favorable balance
between the potential social benefit and individual rights." Normally,
an agency must act according to its governing authority" and should
not override an individual's constitutional rights. Yet administrative
enforcement or agency action," while distinct from a criminal or civil
matter, sometimes affects the non-proprietary privilege of a party.
For example, a consumer may believe that an agency's regulation
should protect his or her individual interest, when in fact the
underlying purpose of the regulation is to protect the public as a
whole.'9 However, it is not uncommon for people to lack awareness of
the extent of an agency's authority or the reason for its regulation
until they are adversely affected by agency action." Once faced with
12. The term "agency" refers to an entity subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) as well as similar acts at the state level. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006).
13. NLRB v. Millwrights Local 1102, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 779 F.2d
349, 350 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[A]dministrative agencies are frequently given rather loosely
defined powers to cope with [difficult] problems .... ").
14. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151
(1991) ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances
calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that
the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers.").
15. Pirlott v. NLRB, 522 F.3d 423,433 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
[I]t is the role of the agency charged with administrating a statute to make
the initial interpretation of that law--one that will be overturned only when
the agency acts without delegated authority, or its action is at odds with the
plain meaning of the authorizing statute, unreasonable, or arbitrary and
capricious.
Id.
16. United States v. Spano, 476 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2007) ("As exercises of
lawfully delegated legislative authority, particular guidelines [of an agency that exercises
policy-making authority delegated to it by Congress] can be invalidated by a court only if
they violate the defendant's constitutional rights." (citations omitted)).
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).
18. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw-Hill Co., 390 F. Supp.
2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2005).
19. See generally United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Nutritional
Health Alliance v. FDA, 318 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2003); Simpson v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1148 (1995).
20. See generally Tracy v. Beaufort County Bd. of Educ., 335 F. Supp. 2d 675 (D. S.C.
2004); Powe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 282 F. App'x 808 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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administrative adjudication,21 the agency has an obligation to ensure
that the affected party' is given notice of certain rights." A discussion
on how due process affects an individual's right or privilege will serve
to elucidate the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and
agency action.4
Congress confers statutory authority upon an agency to regulate a
particular area and further grants it the power to promulgate rules in
accordance with that specific authority.25 This delegation of authority
from the legislative to the executive branch must be accomplished
with careful consideration to the separation of powers.26
[A] delegation is predicated upon a .. . judgment on the part of
the legislature, for the legislature ... has chosen to entrust a
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2006).
22. See id. § 551(3).
23. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994).
It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague
regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency
greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the
more cumbersome rulemaking process. Nonetheless, agency rules should be
clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice
concerning the agency's understanding of the law.
Id.
24. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are among the
"[g]reat [constitutional] concepts... purposely left to gather meaning from
experience.... [T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic
fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a
stagnant society remains unchanged." For that reason, the Court has fully
and finally rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and
"privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due
process rights. The Court has also made clear that the property interests
protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money. By the same token, the Court has required
due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal
constraints imposed by the criminal process.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (footnotes
omitted).
25. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that
an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress.").
26. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("Although not 'hermetically' sealed
from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable.
When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has
delegated to it." (citation omitted)). However, "[t]he Constitution does not contemplate
total separation of the three branches of Government. '[A] hermetic sealing off of the
three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively."' Id. at 999 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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private body with law making functions in order to take
advantage of a body with expertise and experience in a
particular area requiring the exercise of professional judgment
and specialized skills."
Once the legislature clearly defines these standards, the
delegation may be used to benefit the public interest, convenience, or
necessity under regulations promulgated by the agency.8 "'The rise of
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal
trend of the last century .... They have become a veritable fourth
branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch
legal theories . . . ."'
Theoretically, agencies and officials [are] asked only to fill up
the details, [under the notion] that Congress cannot delegate
any part of its legislative power except under a limitation of a
prescribed standard. If Congress shall lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [practice or perform some regulated act] is directed to
conform, such legiSlative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power. o
Agencies are responsible for enforcing the authority granted by
the legislature and are also afforded great deference for its
interpretation of that delegated authority." Stated another way,
although an administrative agency may be delegated specific statutory
authority to regulate a particular profession, it is up to the agency to
specify the details of enforcing that authority through its rules and
policies.32 Each agency further has a responsibility of investigating and
enforcing the provisions under its authority.33 This entails balancing
27. Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
28. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
30. Id. at 985 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
32. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that Congress frequently leaves certain details unspecified
in a statutory scheme[] and delegates rulemaking authority to an agency to
fill in the details necessary to administer the statute. Thus, where "Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44)) (citations omitted).
33. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are
affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures."); see also
374 [Vol. 51:369
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the need for regulation against the due process rights of the affected
party.' To accomplish this balance, the agency's mechanism must look
at several factors: (1) the private interest affected by the action; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used; (3) the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (4) the government's interest, which
includes analyzing the function involved, as well as the related fiscal
and administrative burdens, all in efforts toward fairness."
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: DUE PROCESS, SELF-INCRIMINATION
& DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A. Due Process
General due process considerations of fairness directly limit the
manner in which an agency may exercise its designated
responsibilities. A practice which violates due process cannot be
excused because of mere administrative inconvenience.
However, the full rights of due process present in a court of law
do not automatically attach. An administrative agency's actions
may be only investigatory, only adjudicatory, or a combination
of both, and the due process that must be accorded in an
administrative proceeding depends upon the nature of the
administrative agency's actions. The level of due process
required in an administrative setting must be decided under the
facts and circumstances of each case. In addition, any
administrative agency in determining how best to effectuate
public policy is limited by principles of fundamental fairness.
Despite due process guarantees, an individual who faces agency
action may be subjected to the possible loss of a proprietary interest
or the ability to obtain a privilege, such as a license or permit." He or
Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408 (1928).
34. At the same time, the agency is also governed by the limitations of its authority.
See generally Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
35. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
36. 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 56 (2004) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
37. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing
2009)] 375
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she may also be the subject of an agency's declaratory ruling or
opinion." However, under an application of the Fifth Amendment,
the individual is entitled to procedural due process, affording him or
her notice and potential entry into the administrative process." Before
the privilege or interest is taken away by the government, an
individual is entitled to notice and a hearing, prior to the sanctioning
of a license.4 An applicant for licensure is also entitled to notice and a
hearing in the event the agency decides to deny the issuance of a
license to practice or application to engage in a particular activity.
At times, an agency may not have adequate information on which
to make a decision. Under such circumstances, implicit authority
allows the agency to request additional information, possibly in the
form of an investigative inquiry proceeding. 42  "[The Fifth
Amendment] can [also] be asserted in [an administrative]
proceeding ... and it protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could
lead to other evidence that might be so used." 43 During the inquiry or
a written request for additional information, the agency may acquire
disclosures that subject the applicant to criminal or civil liability."
While the applicant attempts to provide the presiding body with
evidence of his or her good character-honesty or fitness to obtain
licensure, for instance-he or she may inadvertently provide
incriminating information regarding prior conduct.45
to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Id.
38. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 678 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1179
(2008).
39. See W. Power Sports, Inc. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1317 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2008) ("To satisfy the requirements of Fifth Amendment procedural due process,
agency notice is only required to: (1) alert interested parties of the issue at hand; and (2)
provide a reasonable opportunity for the recipient to object to the issues raised."); see also
Vail v. Brown, 841 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (D. Minn. 1994) ("The Fifth Amendment requires
that, before a federal agency may take an action which affects a constitutionally-protected
interest in life, liberty, or property, '[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to
be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."' (quoting
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972))); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
40. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2006).
41. See Save Our Dunes v. Ala. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 834 F.2d 984, 989-90 (11th
Cir. 1987).
42. See Morgan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 473 F. Supp. 2d 756, 767 (E.D. Mich. 2007),
affd, Morgan v. Bureau of Alchohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 509 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2438 (2008).
43. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972) (footnote omitted).
44. See Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. See id.
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B. Self-Incrimination
In the face of past indiscretions, a second important application
of the Fifth Amendment-the right against self-incrimination-must
be affirmatively invoked.' The agency, however, does not have an
obligation to inform an adverse party of his or her ability to invoke
the Fifth Amendment.47 Conversely, the agency may argue that
without access to such information it may not have adequate
information on which to base a decision, thereby forcing the applicant
to prove entitlement to licensure." The choice whether to apply for
licensure resides with the applicant, and it is also up to the applicant
whether or not to provide relevant information, which could infringe
on the right against self-incrimination.49
The Fifth Amendment privilege protects a person who invokes
it from self-accusation; but when he seeks a license at the hands
of an agency acting under the standard of the public interest[]
and information substantially relevant to that standard is
withheld under the privilege, as may be done, the need for the
information and the cooperation of the applicant with respect to
it remains. The agency cannot be required to act without the
information. To hold otherwise would carry the privilege
beyond its purpose. While its invocation may not be considered
ground for disqualification, for the privilege is available to the
innocent as well as to the non-innocent, the lack of relevant
information [that] follows in the wake of its assertion leaves a
gap in data[,] which the applicant can supply.0
46. See id.
47. See id. at 560-61.
48. Chi. Grain Prod. Co. v. Mellon, 14 F.2d 362,364 (7th Cir. 1926).
The burden is not upon the government to show that an applicant is not
entitled to a permit, but is upon the applicant to show that he is entitled to
one. The character and fitness of the men who are to control the business of
the permittee is of very large importance.
Id.; see also Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 233-34 (3d Cir. 1985).
49. Blumenthal v. FCC, 318 F.2d 276, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951
(1963).
Dismissal of an application for refusal of the applicant to fill the
informational gap leads to an unhappy result. For it attaches significance to
exercise of the privilege[] and exerts pressure upon the applicant to waive it.
Yet, on the other hand, there remains the inability of the Commission to
obtain his help in supplying relevant information available to him. He
applies for the license. The Commission cannot be required to act on his
application without the relevant light he can supply and which the
Commission is authorized to seek. ... The choice is that of the applicant.
Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
2009] 377
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When providing background information, the applicant has an
incentive to disclose that his or her character warrants the receipt of
licensure." Meanwhile, it is the agency's responsibility to strictly
protect the public by preventing unscrupulous individuals or entities
from engaging in a particular practice detrimental to the public.52 In
the event an applicant discloses a prior criminal offense on an
application, the agency must decide whether the individual may pose a
danger or threat to society." To this end, some agencies follow a
statutory or rule scheme in assessing the severity of the offense in
enforcing a waiting period before granting licensure.'
In lieu of such a specific scheme, an inquiry hearing may serve to
allow the applicant to explain or mitigate the circumstances of the
criminal behavior, assuring the presiding body that the prior
misconduct will not affect the applicant's professional practice.
Although this may result in a final determination for or against based
on the weight afforded to the credibility of the applicant's evidence by
the presiding body, there may be a strong propensity to interrogate
the applicant as to the details of his or her background." For example,
an applicant who may have pled no contest to a criminal offense may
be placed in the difficult situation of having to disclose this
information prior to licensure in order to dispel doubts regarding his
or her character. 6 The resulting problem is that an applicant faces a
conscious decision whether or not an admission of prior misconduct is
necessary in order to obtain the license, without being afforded a full
explanation of the consequences to his or her rights."
There is no affirmative requirement that the agency inform
affected parties of their constitutional rights and how these rights
51. See De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 194 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Ramirez v. Ahn, 843
F.2d 864, 869 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577,
589 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
53. See Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 236-39 (3d Cir. 1985).
54. See Paris Adult Bookstore II v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 234 (1990); Spicer v.
D.C. Real Estate Comm'n, 636 A.2d 415, 418 (1993); City of Elko v. Abed, 677 N.W.2d
455, 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Pittenger v. Dep't of State, 596 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991).
55. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 742 F. Supp. 450, 452
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
56. See id. at 451, 453 (noting that a government agency required applicants to
disclose drug and alcohol use).
57. See id at 453.
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apply in adjudicatory or rulemaking proceedings." While any agency
must afford procedural due process, there is no administrative
equivalent to the Miranda warning."9 Requisitely, the agency must
notify the parties of an impending action and that this action may be
detrimental to their interests. However, the agency is not required to
properly notify them that any information collected could be used
against them either in the current or subsequent proceedings" "[T]he
Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not
[the disclosure of] private information.' 61 Once individuals have
gained access to the adjudicatory remedies or rulemaking procedures
afforded in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), they are
presumed to be acquainted with the multitude of civil and criminal
concepts embedded in the process, as well as how they correlate with
the agency's action.62
The Court has already stated that there is no Fifth Amendment
violation where an agency requires certain records from licensed
individuals or entities-known as the "required records doctrine"-
after they have engaged in a pervasively regulated practice.6' This
interpretation permits the compelled production of private records
where an agency requires that a particular record be regularly kept
and maintained under a regulatory scheme.' The reason for such may
be that the applicant voluntarily entered into a regulated industry,
which may justify requiring the applicant to maintain records
according to the regulatory standards as a way to safeguard the
58. The APA requires that "[plersons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be
timely informed of-(1) the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) the legal authority
and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters of fact and law
asserted." 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2006). The APA further requires an agency to afford notice
of a proposed rule and an opportunity for the public to comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(2006). In light of this, the Supreme Court held that "courts could only in 'extraordinary
circumstances' impose procedural requirements on an agency beyond those specified in the
APA. It is within an agency's discretion to afford parties more procedure, but it is not the
province of the courts to do so." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312-13 (1979).
59. Compare § 554(b) (describing various due process provisions provided by
agencies) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (describing the due process
requirements for criminal defendants).
60. See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 312-13; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45
(1972).
61. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,401 (1976) (quoting United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
62. See Aeronautical Repair Station Ass'n v. FAA, 494 F.3d 161, 170 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
63. See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-69 (1968).
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public.6 ' Essentially, such records take on characteristics of public
documents.'
Where [the Government seeks] to inspect public documents at
the place of business where they are required to be kept,
permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where
private papers are sought. The demand is one of right. When the
custodian is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to
surrender them and he hands them over, duress and coercion
will not be so readily implied as where private papers are
involved. The custodian in this situation is not protected against
the production of incriminating documents. The strict test of
consent, designed to protect an accused against production of
incriminating evidence, has no place here. The right of privacy,
of course, remains.67
From the agency's perspective, the purpose of eliciting
information about an applicant's character and the purpose of the
required records doctrine is the same-the protection of the public
good." An agency's authority in promulgating regulations requiring
certain records has a public interest aspect for which the agency must
ensure compliance.69 At the application stage, the individual is not yet
bound by the full purview of the agency's regulatory authority.o And
as previously stated, the individual may affirmatively refuse to answer
to prior misconduct, even though the agency is not required to inform
an applicant of this right." After the applicant obtains a license, he or
she may be subject to the required records doctrine.72 A licensee may
also affirmatively assert the Fifth Amendment the same as an
applicant." After asserting that right, however, both the applicant and
licensee may further have to show entitlement to the licensure
65. See Richert, 35 F.3d at 301-02.
66. See id. at 301.
67. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original).
68. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1948).
69. Donovan v. Mehlenbacher, 652 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Under th[e]
doctrine, records required to be kept pursuant to valid regulatory programs have a 'public
aspect' for purposes of constitutional analysis, and thus are not private papers entitled to
the protection of the [F]ourth or [F]ifth [A]mendments.").
70. See Hous. Auth. of Seattle v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 629 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th
Cir. 1980).
71. See supra text accompanying note 58; see also Trs. for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d
549, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Illinois, 298 U.S. 155, 157 (1936).
73. See generally United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Avila v. Colo. Supreme
Court Grievance Comm., 704 F. Supp. 195 (D. Colo. 1989).
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privilege.74 Here again, the agency is not obligated to ensure
prevention of any self-incriminating material from being used in a
proceeding."
Moreover, protection from self-incrimination becomes
problematic for a licensee during an agency investigation, especially
when trying to distinguish between the public aspects of the required
material from what may strictly be private material." In other words, a
licensee may end up inadvertently commingling personal material
with other required records." Generally, the agency is not required to
disclose the extent of an ongoing investigation against a licensee or
the extent to which subpoena power may be used to gather
incriminating evidence. Thus, the personal material made part of the
business record may summarily be subject to an investigation.79 The
records collected pursuant to an investigation may subsequently be
used in an agency action and, absent a specific exemption, may further
be the subject of a request under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)." Under such a scenario, the agency is also not responsible for
preventing incriminating information from being disclosed to third
parties, unless the individual specifically asserts and shows entitlement
to the privilege against self-incrimination.81 This doctrine also creates
74. See Herman v. Galvin, 40 F. Supp. 2d 27, 28-29 (D. Mass. 1999).
75. See id. at 28.
76. Balt. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990) ("[N]o Fifth
Amendment protection attache[s] to production of the 'required records,' which the
'defendant was required to keep, not for his private uses, but for the benefit of the public,
and for public inspection."' (quoting Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1948))).
77. See SEC v. O'Brien, 467 U.S. 735, 737-39 (1984).
78. See id. at 745.
79. See id. at 743.
80. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142, 144 (1989).
In enacting the FOIA 23 years ago, Congress sought to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny. Congress did so by requiring agencies
to adhere to a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.
... First, an agency must either create or obtain the requested materials
as a prerequisite to its becoming an "agency record" within the meaning of
the FOIA. In performing their official duties, agencies routinely avail
themselves of studies, trade journal reports, and other materials produced
outside the agencies both by private and governmental organizations. To
restrict the term "agency records" to materials generated internally would
frustrate Congress's desire to put within public reach the information
available to an agency in its decision-making processes.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
81. Hollinger Int't Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., No. 04 C 698, 2005 WL 3177880, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 19, 2005) ("Parties that provide documents to the government may request
confidential treatment to prevent public disclosure in response to a FOIA request. FOIA
precludes the government from disclosing Defendants' 'commercial or financial
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confusion about the individual's intention to disclose personal
information when filing or keeping records dealing with an agency,
similar to the problem applicants have when requesting licensure.'
The procedural consequences to affected parties are that the
negligence or disregard by which the non-required information was
inadvertently included in their records may determine the parties'
ability to assert the privilege." The agency may then conduct an
evidentiary hearing under a reasonableness standard to determine a
party's entitlement." While the agency may argue that the information
was voluntarily included in a required record, the party must be given
an opportunity to present a reason for the refusal of disclosure once
the privilege is asserted." Fundamentally, this means that the agency
may not circumvent the right against self-incrimination under the
guise of the required records doctrine." However, the application of
this limitation on the privilege and the determination of whether an
individual has the right to invoke a personal privilege is determined
strictly on a case-by-case basis." Affected parties, therefore, must be
extremely careful when dealing with required records. For instance,
[i]f a subpoena demanded all the documents possessed by the
subpoenaed person concerning some subject, by producing them
the person would be acknowledging that he possessed them and
that they concerned the subject in question, and if this
acknowledgment was self-incriminating he could not be forced
to produce them. But if the documents were required records
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."' (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(4) (2006))); Canadian Commercial Corp. v. Dep't of Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
Commercial or financial information obtained from a person involuntarily
"is 'confidential' for purposes of the exemption if disclosure [would
either]... impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information
in the future; or ... cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the
person from whom the information was obtained." ... A person whose
information is about to be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request may file a
"reverse-FOIA action" and seek to enjoin the Government from disclosing
it.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974)) (alteration in original).
82. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 607-08 n.3 (1984).
83. See Vanguard Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Banks, No. 93-CV-4627, 1995 WL 555871, at
*4-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1995).
84. See Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 827 F.2d 699, 701-02
(11th Cir. 1987).
85. See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1994).
86. See id.
87. See id.
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the person could not resist the subpoena on this ground.8
The underlying policy behind the required records doctrine is in
line with how agencies have dealt with adjudicatory proceedings-by
distinguishing the individual's interest from the need for regulation.
The individual engages in a practice, is in contact with consumers, and
then ultimately is held accountable by the government after the
administrative process.' When an agency suspends the ability to
practice or issues a fine, the individual may no longer have the
authority to conduct a transaction for the consumer or must comply
with certain obligations to continue practicing.91 Since the "ability to
practice" is at stake rather than an individual's freedom, the
constitutional burden for the agency to take away the privilege is less
demanding.92
It appears that when the government directly intrudes on
individual liberties, the application of the Fifth Amendment is subject
to stricter scrutiny. 3  For example, a government employment
application may require information regarding the applicant's prior
use of drugs and alcohol,' and the government may seek to reserve
88. Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
89. BNSF Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 566 F.3d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
("[O]ne's privacy interests can only be diminished by a valid regulation."); see also
Seaboard Sys. R.R., 827 F.2d at 701-02.
90. In re Stoltz, 315 F.3d 80, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (Walker, C.J., dissenting).
[A license] allows the grant-holder to engage in certain regulated conduct.
The government grants real estate, drivers, liquor, or medical licenses;
building or emissions permits; bank or corporate charters; and cable
television or electricity distribution franchises. . . . [T]he common thread is
the government's role as a gatekeeper in determining who may pursue
certain livelihoods.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Olsen v. Idaho Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2004).
92. Green v. Brantley, 719 F. Supp. 1570, 1579-80 (N.D. Ga. 1989), vacated, 981 F.2d
514 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The due process standards under [the APA are] not as stringent as
the maximum procedural due process required by the Fifth Amendment." (citations
omitted)).
It has [also] long been established that the more stringent requirements of
due process [that] attach in an adjudicatory proceeding are generally not
compelled when agency action of a more legislative nature is pursued:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption.
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town
meeting or an assembly of the whole.... There must be a limit to
individual argument in such matters if government is to go on.
Love v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 704 F.2d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)).
93. See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
94. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 742 F. Supp. 450, 453
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the right to submit this information to federal, state, and local
authorities." Given such a situation, the applicant may wish to claim
Fifth Amendment protection. The government could then assert that
it intends to use the information "only as a basis for an investigation
into the applicant's suitability for Federal employment and eligibility
for any required security clearance."6 This explanation, however, fails
to adequately disclose how the information "would be sufficiently
protected from release to law enforcement agencies."" The
government's assurances could not offer adequate protection, and the
request would be in violation of a right to privacy, absent a strong
governmental interest in obtaining the information, and potentially
also in violation of the applicant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination." The applicant should not be forced to balance the
employment or authorization being sought with the possibility that the
information could be used by another agency in an incriminating
99
manner.
Most rules of conduct having the force of law are not self-
executing but require judicial or administrative action to impose
their sanctions with respect to particular individuals. Unlike an
administrative order or a court judgment adjudicating the rights
of individuals, which is binding only on the parties to the
particular proceeding, a valid exercise of the rule-making power
is addressed to and sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its
terms apply. It operates as such in advance of the imposition of
sanctions upon any particular individual. It is common
experience that men conform their conduct to regulations by
governmental authority so as to avoid the unpleasant legal
consequences which failure to conform entails.
... [Licensees, for instance,] are free only in the sense that all
those who do not choose to conform to regulations which may
be determined to be lawful are free by their choice to accept the
legal consequences of their acts. Failure to comply with the
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
95. See id. at 455-56 (declaring, however, that the information must be sufficiently
protected from release to law enforcement agencies).
96. Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. See id. at 455-56.
98. See id.
99. See United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 662 (2008) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation when an agency advised
certain defendants of their rights during an administrative deposition but failed to inform
them that a parallel criminal investigation had been opened by a separate agency and that
they were using the incriminating information elicited during the deposition).
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regulations entails ... loss of [licensure].'o
C. Double Jeopardy
The third important aspect of the Fifth Amendment in
administrative proceedings is the application of double jeopardy.'o' In
short, an affected party may not necessarily enjoy the prohibition of
double jeopardy for agency action similarly situated to a criminal
action." For example, "an administrative license revocation [is]
'remedial' in nature, and therefore subsequent criminal prosecution
on the same grounds [is] not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause."'a This is generally considered the case in administrative law,
even though the agency's prosecution of a regulatory requirement
may actually contain criminal elements' "While there is some case
law that indicates disciplinary proceedings may be 'quasi-criminal' in
nature, it is clear that administrative proceedings are not subject to
the Double Jeopardy Clause."'
The issue of jeopardy begins with a determination of whether
agency action is criminal or civil in nature. In order to avoid the
ramifications of jeopardy, the judiciary has generally viewed agency
action as civil in light of the remedial purpose of regulatory
100. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1942).
101. See United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442, 443 (9th Cir. 1991).
102. See id.; see also Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107
(1991) ("[The courts have] long favored application of the common-law doctrines of
collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of
administrative bodies that have attained finality.").
103. Rivera v. Pugh, 194 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing State v. Zerkel, 900
P.2d 744, 754 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)).
104. For example, a licensee may be required to perform certain tasks or manage a
business practice in a certain manner in order to maintain his or her licensure. The licensee
may have been required to maintain or deliver escrow funds in a certain manner or time
frame, or he or she may have been required to maintain proper registration with the
agency at the time the violation occurred in order to practice. These are requirements
which would subject the licensee to administrative discipline. In the event that the licensee
absconds with funds from a client, there may also be civil conversion or criminal theft
issues. Stated another way, an agency complaint against a licensee that alleges fraud is
treated differently that an administrative obligation without a criminal element, such as
failure to properly maintain an escrow account. Since the charge of fraud has an
implication of criminal behavior, the agency must seek to prove allegations of personal
conduct by the individual. The escrow account charge, however, may merely require that
the agency collect the books under the required records doctrine during an investigation
and purport that it does not comply with the regulatory requirements. While this may
result in an administrative penalty, it may be significantly less severe than a charge of
fraud. See generally Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976); Ward v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 833 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion).
105. Marinangeli v. Lehman, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1998) (citations omitted).
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authority.'0 Initially, before an agency can even adjudicate certain
actions involving prior criminal activity or allow criminal authorities
to pursue subsequent criminal action, the agency requires a specific
delegation of authority."o7 This authority can then be used to
determine the intent of the legislature with regard to double
jeopardy." Irrespective of agency authority, it is fundamentally
important that a controversy is resolved only once, whether in a
criminal court or before an administrative body.'" However, even
when a defendant is acquitted of criminal charges, the agency may still
initiate administrative action based on a concern over the licensee's
character and fitness.' The argument in favor of the agency is that the
government would be unable to effectively regulate an individual's
dealings with the public if administrative action was not allowed.'
The licensee, on the other hand, also has a valid interest in
complying with additional administrative action. In order to show his
or her good character, he or she may be urged to re-litigate the
offense as evidence of mitigation. 112 The final outcome, however, is
106. United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1998).
[The] first task is to determine whether the government intended the
proceedings under these regulatory provisions to be "criminal" or "civil."
The second prong of [the] inquiry is whether the "clearest proof" exists
to show that the sanctions authorized in these regulations are "so punitive in
form and effect as to render them criminal despite [the government's] intent
to the contrary."
Id. (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 n.6 (1986) ("[A] controversy should be
resolved once, not more than once. The principle is as much needed for administrative
decisions as for judicial decisions. To the extent that administrative adjudications resemble
courts' decisions-a very great extent-the law worked out for courts does and should
apply to agencies.").
110. McKnight v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 105 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[The
r]esolution of criminal charges in favor of a defendant does not bar subsequent civil or
administrative proceedings concerning the very same underlying misconduct. . . .").
111. "That acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a civil action by the
Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same set of facts on which the
criminal proceeding was based has long been settled." Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
397 (1938).
112. See Zukas v. Hinson, 124 F.3d 1407, 1412 (11th Cir. 1997).
Only when the civil sanction serves a retributive or deterrent purpose does
the sanction constitute punishment and violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
[For example, r]evoking a pilot certificate by the FAA to ensure air safety
by removing an unqualified pilot [convicted of conspiracy and intent to
distribute cocaine] from the ranks of those who hold pilot certificates
granted by the FAA serves a remedial purpose.
Id (citations omitted).
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still structured in favor of the agency preventing unscrupulous
behavior in the profession, in light of the licensee's recent criminal
activity."3
A doctor might well go to prison for a misdeed in connection
with his practice and yet not automatically lose his right to
practice medicine.... [A hearing is required] since broader
issues than those in the criminal case are involved, e.g., whether
the misdeed is of a character to make it unsafe and improvident
for the State to entrust a medical license to that person.114
Moreover, an agency may summarily decide to wait until the
completion of a criminal proceeding before initiating administrative
action."' This would allow it the opportunity to obtain further
investigatory material or to utilize a criminal judgment against the
licensee during the administrative adjudication."'
113. See id.
114. Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 9 (1964).
The [F]ifth [A]mendment, as applicable to the states, prohibits [an affected
party] from being twice subjected to criminal punishment. Imposition of
both criminal and civil sanctions for the same acts or omissions does not
violate the double jeopardy clause. Thus, the question is whether
administrative suspension of [a] medical license constitutes a criminal, or
essentially criminal, sanction.
Medical license revocation proceedings are highly penal in the sense that
valuable rights are at stake, but revocation of privileges voluntarily granted
is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element. Despite the
sanction's severity, its character is remedial.
Consequently, [any affected party has] not twice received criminal
punishment for the same offense.
Emory v. Tex. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 748 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
115. See United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 1984).
[C]ollateral estoppel ... [could affect] executive branch decisions to enforce
regulatory schemes. If an administrative decision against the Government
precluded subsequent prosecutions, the Government might hesitate to bring
enforcement proceedings at all. The clear intent of Congress in the
establishment of these regulatory schemes was to provide an informal and
expeditious adjudicatory setting for the determination of regulatory
violations, subject, of course, to various mechanisms of review. If we were to
endow initial administrative decisions with preclusive effects on criminal
actions, the Government would either have to postpone the administrative
action until it obtained a favorable result in the corresponding criminal case
or have to allocate substantially greater resources to the enforcement of
regulations to increase the likelihood of a favorable outcome at the
administrative level.
Id.
116. See id.
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D. A Potential Remedy
The aforementioned Fifth Amendment issues may be resolved in
the APA by requiring an administrative warning or explanation of
rights similar to those stipulated under Miranda."' In a criminal
proceeding, the Miranda warning is required before a custodial
interrogation."' However, there is no equivalent broad-based
administrative requirement imposed on an agency investigator.
While procedural due process provides notice to the affected party, a
similarly written notice could be provided when the agency sends an
affected party notification of an administrative investigation or
provides entry into the administrative process.120
A Miranda equivalent administrative warning, codified in the
APA, could streamline these interpretations for every agency. 2' A
basic requirement of such a warning could include information on the
agency's right of access to business records, clarification of the
affected party's right against self-incrimination, and, finally, a
requirement that any investigation be conducted by an agency
investigator.122 A waiver of such rights, operating in similar fashion as
a waiver of the Miranda rights, could then fully apprise an individual
of third party access to the information collected for possible criminal
prosecution.123 In addition to an explanation of the hearing rights
under the APA,124 an administrative warning could benefit the
117. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
118. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000).
119. See Stickler v. Dep't of Def., 264 F. App'x 886, 887-88 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
120. Id. at 888. ("[E]ven if Miranda applie[d in administrative] proceedings, [it would
only be] necessary in custodial interrogations.").
121. "As a general matter, the APA applies to all federal agencies...." Howard v.
Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 536 (M.D. La. 2003).
122. See United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151, 164-65 (N.D. Ill. 1990). In Keller,
IRS agents, acting under direction of the United States Attorney and not pursuant to an
administrative investigation,
identified themselves and [informed a criminal defendant that] they wanted
to ask questions about [certain business] transactions . . .. [The defendant]
was not given Miranda or administrative warnings.
Since none of the defendants were in custody, the IRS agents were not
obliged to give Miranda warnings.
... [The court refused to suppress the statements, holding that the
defendant's will was not overborne and that f]ailure to reveal that the person
being interviewed [was] the subject of [an] investigation [was] not, by itself, a
ground for suppressing the statements obtained.
Id.
123. See id.
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2006).
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individual by focusing on the specific rights of affected parties during
administrative investigations.
As it stands, an individual dealing with an agency representative
may not fully understand the nuances of administrative law and
unwittingly subject him or herself to future criminal or civil liability.126
As adjudication under the APA is important enough to invoke
procedural due process, the notion of fundamental fairness should
extend to all aspects of the proceeding, focusing on what the
individual reasonably believes is the use of evidence collected during
an agency investigation and his or her understanding of the right to
remain silent.127 To curtail these issues, policy makers can consider
enacting language-as part of the APA-to apprise an affected party
of how the Fifth Amendment is applied in administrative
adjudication. Agencies can then include a summary of rights that
merely cites to the Act in a charging document, which would not
impose an overly burdensome administrative cost.
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: COUNSEL AND CONFRONTATION
In seeking to provide defendants with fair access, the right to
counsel and the Confrontation Clause are embedded within our
system of criminal justice.'n Formal and, more so, informal
administrative proceedings could embrace the spirit of these concepts
while still balancing the government's regulatory enforcement scheme
against an affected party's opportunity for redress.129 The current
process, however, operates according to its own procedural
applications rather than strictly being defined by the civil rules of
125. "[Currently, tihe standards that apply to administrative inspections are not, by
their very nature, the same that apply to criminal searches and seizures." United States v.
Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14, 17 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
126. See id.
127. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972).
128. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,146 (2006).
[T]he purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure the reliability of
evidence .... [It] "commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination."
So also with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. It
commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness
be provided-to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes
to be best.
Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,61 (2004)) (citations omitted).
129. "[Under the federal APA, w]here the remedy for an evil is clear, the remedial
provisions of the [Act] should be given full effect." Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp. v. Atl. Coast
Line R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 436, 440 (1957).
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procedure or evidentiary rules. 30 "[A] hearing granted does not cease
to be fair[] merely because rules of evidence and of procedure
applicable in judicial proceedings have not been strictly followed by
the executive; or because some evidence has been improperly rejected
or received."'' In the event that there is a disparity between the
remedies afforded under the civil rules and that of the agency, the
courts have attributed the administrative authority to the agency,
rather than merely applying the civil rules.'
A. The Right to Counsel
The APA specifically provides a right to counsel where an
individual is compelled to appear before an agency.1' An accountant,
for instance, may be subpoenaed by the IRS to answer questions
dealing with a tax return prepared for a client.3 4 "This right to have
counsel in such cases is founded, not upon any constitutional right, but
upon the [APA] .... "1 It has also been extended to a formal or
informal proceeding requested by an affected party due to agency
action."' Essentially, the right to counsel is tantamount to an
opportunity to obtain counsel, and is therefore limited in an
130. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 327 (2004) ("[T]he rules of civil
procedure do not apply to discovery in administrative proceedings unless specifically
provided by statute."). Further, "the technical rules of evidence that govern procedures in
the courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative proceedings." Nadiak v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 305 F.2d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 1962).
131. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923).
132. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (noting that an injunctive remedy against a corporation under the civil rules was
equivalent to agency authority to issue a cease and desist order against the corporation);
see also Van Houten v. Hixon, No. 06-3102-CM, 2006 WL 2920575, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Oct.
11, 2006) (noting that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
equivalent to a civil motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2006) ("A person compelled to appear in person before an
agency or representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised
by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative.").
134. See Backer v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 275 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1960).
It is clear that the right to counsel guaranteed under the Administrative
Procedure Act is much broader than the right to have an attorney to advise
him relative to his rights under the Fifth Amendment. The Act says such
counsel may accompany, represent and advise the witness, without any
limitation.
Id.
135. United States v. McPhaul, 617 F. Supp. 58, 59 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
136. § 555(b) ("A party is entitled to appear in person or by or with counsel or other
duly qualified representative in an agency proceeding.").
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administrative proceeding."' It is further only afforded to the affected
party, precluding any other party in an industry that may be affected
by the agency's final decision.
In an administrative hearing, the affected party may appear in
person or with counsel, but if he or she appears in person, there is no
entitlement to thereafter obtain counsel.3  Conversely, if the agency
was previously aware that the affected party retained counsel after the
action was initiated but before the proceeding, it is required to afford
proper notice to the party's counsel.'4 A party may decide, for
instance, to personally appear before the agency to simply explain the
reasons for his or her actions without understanding the nuances of a
formal or informal proceeding. Essentially, however, in the event the
party appears pro se at a proceeding, he or she may not thereafter be
137. United States v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The Sixth
Amendment requires only that a defendant be given a fair or reasonable opportunity to
obtain particular counsel; it does not guarantee an absolute right to the counsel of one's
choice.").
138. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 443-44 (1960).
[T]he investigative process could be completely disrupted if investigative
hearings were transformed into trial-like proceedings, and if persons who
might be indirectly affected by an investigation were given an absolute right
to cross-examine every witness called to testify. Fact-finding agencies
without any power to adjudicate would be diverted from their legitimate
duties and would be plagued by the injection of collateral issues that would
make the investigation interminable. Even a person not called as a witness
could demand the right to appear at the hearing, cross-examine any witness
whose testimony or sworn affidavit allegedly defamed or incriminated him,
and call an unlimited number of witnesses of his own selection. This type of
proceeding would make a shambles of the investigation and stifle the agency
in its gathering of facts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
In today's complex social and governmental structure in which
Congressional policies are effectuated through agencies having investigatory
functions the results of which most often lead to quasi civil sanctions but
which not infrequently lead to criminal prosecutions, this essential role
would be frustrated by requiring those persons not parties who might be
later affected to be allowed to take an active part through private counsel in
such proceedings. Often such proceedings involve a nationwide industry or
industry practice and can start out with no fixed goal since many such
agencies can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 174 (5th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
139. See 900 G.C. Affiliates, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 367 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
140. See Garcia-Guzman v. Reno, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("We
disaprove of an administrative agency scheduling a hearing for a person who it knows is
represented by counsel without giving reasonable notice to the lawyer.. .. [It] is more than
simply discourteous; it is unfair.").
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entitled to a continuance in order to seek the services of an attorney.141
As such, this inability to later obtain counsel leads to a wide range of
adverse consequences if the party is not provided with adequate
information pertaining to his or her rights. 42
The Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to
counsel in a civil case or in a civil matter before an
administrative agency. The statutory right to counsel under the
Administrative Procedure Act has been construed to mean the
right to counsel of one's choice. In addition, where the right to
counsel exists, the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment does provide some protection for the decision to
select a particular attorney. That protection, however, goes no
further than preventing arbitrary dismissal of a chosen
attorney[] and providing a fair opportunity to secure counsel of
one's choice. Thus the right to counsel does not mean an
absolute right to the lawyer of one's choice. 43
The adjudicatory process is already daunting to the pro se
litigant, who must attempt to understand the varying policies and
procedures that differ among agencies'" and the degree of civil and
criminal influences on the process.145 The unrepresented individual
141. See 900 G.C. Affiliates, Inc., 367 F. Supp. at 4-5.
That [a] hearing examiner did not grant... a continuance ... does not
constitute evidence of a deprivation of due process. The matter of granting a
continuance before an administrative agency rests in the sound discretion of
the hearing examiner unless there is a clear showing of abuse of that
discretion.
Id.
142. See In re Coleman, 560 F.3d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).
143. Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600, 618 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(citations omitted) (inernal quotations omitted).
144. See Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1158 (2008).
[I]n the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading
standard than other parties. In the administrative context now before us it
appears pro se filings may be the rule, not the exception.... The system
must be accessible to individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the
relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes. ...
Reasonable arguments can be made that the agency should adopt a
standard giving more guidance to filers, making it clear that the request to
act must be stated in quite explicit terms. A rule of that sort might yield
more consistent results. This, however, is a matter for the agency to decide
in light of its experience and expertise in protecting the rights of those who
are covered by the [agency's authority]. For its decisions in this regard the
agency is subject to the oversight of the political branches.
Id. (citation omitted).
145. See Cities Serv. Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 520 F. Supp. 1132, 1140 (D. Del. 1981).
[TJhe constitutional requirement that [an affected party] be faced with some
immediate or certain future injury overlaps with the prudential prerequisite
for preenforcement review that the controversy have a direct and immediate
392 [Vol. 51:369
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may appear before an administrative body with the impression that
the issues raised should be treated the same as a civil dispute, where
recompensing the injured consumer can mitigate any harm to the
public.'" However, the broader policy implications of a regulatory
scheme must be considered. 147 An agency may receive a complaint
from a member of the public, delineating issues with a licensee or
permit holder that may contain instances of possible criminal or
private civil liability.148 The agency's responsibility is to review the
material, gather additional material if necessary, and make a
determination of legal sufficiency or a reasonable basis to initiate a
formal investigation. 149 Any agency action thereafter initiated is also
not dependant on private civil or criminal liability."'o
impact on the [affected party's] business, such impact in the administrative
agency context being in the form of facing the unhappy choice of complying
with agency action believed to be invalid or risking criminal and substantial
civil penalties. Similarly, the constitutional requirement that there be
concrete adversity between the parties is related to the rule that there may
be preenforcement review only of final agency action.
Id.
146. See Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1951).
The courts have uniformly recognized that [certain federal regulations do]
not confer private rights, but granted only rights in the interest of the public
to be protected by a procedure looking solely to public ends. The proceeding
authorized to be taken by [an agency is] not for the adjudication or
vindication of private rights. The .. . function [of] an administrative agency is
to give effect to the declared public policy of Congress. These propositions
have been ... firmly established ....
Id.
147. See id.
148. See Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962).
There is a clear-cut distinction between private interests in civil litigation
and the public interest in a criminal prosecution, between a civil trial and a
criminal trial, and between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.... The very fact that there is clear
distinction between civil and criminal actions requires a government policy
determination of priority: which case should be tried first. Administrative
policy gives priority to the public interest in law enforcement. This seems so
necessary and wise that a trial judge should give substantial weight to it in
balancing the policy against the right of a civil litigant to a reasonably
prompt determination of his civil claims or liabilities.
Id.
149. Penobscot Air Servs, Ltd. v. FAA, 164 F.3d 713, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The
plain meaning of [delegated authority requiring agency investigation] is that the agency
first make[] a determination, based on the complaint, as to whether there is 'a reasonable
ground' for investigating its merits, and if there is, then the agency is mandated to
investigate.").
150. See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 309 U.S. 261,
269-70 (1940) ("[An agency] seeks enforcement as a public agent, not to give effect to a
'private administrative remedy."').
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The public policy behind pursuing a criminal violation is not the
same as the pursuit of an administrative sanction."' The government
seeks to protect society by investigating a crime in order to identify
and punish a specific offender, whereas an agency seeks to investigate
a possible regulatory violation pursuant to a consumer complaint or
through routine checks to ensure compliance.'52 An affected party may
fail to understand the distinction between a regulatory violation that
intends to protect the public and one that seeks to remedy the effects
on victims." After completion of agency action, a victimized
consumer may have to pursue a separate civil action for private
damages." Occasionally, the policies of an administrative and
criminal violation may overlap, where "[tihe public interest may not
always call for criminal prosecution, particularly where effective civil
and administrative remedies have been obtained.",55
An agency, however, is normally not empowered to assist the
consumer without separate, specific delegated authority, such as
having a specific statute allowing the imposition of a restitution
judgment."' Without this authority, a consumer whose funds have
been absconded with by a licensee may not necessarily be awarded
monetary damages by the agency."' Providing the affected party with
information regarding the right to counsel can assist him or her with
understanding these dynamics during the administrative process.'58
B. The Confrontation Clause
The other important aspect of the Sixth Amendment is a
particular application of the Confrontation Clause, even though it is
also a constitutional guarantee applying specifically to criminal
151. See United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 107-08
(1913); Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2005); Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d
1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1973); Rodriguez v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D.P.R. 1982).
152. See Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967).
153. See Bulzan v. Atl. Richfield Co., 620 F.2d 278, 282 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1980)
(noting that the purpose of administrative remedies is to ensure the enforcement of
administrative regulations).
154. Pel-Star Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 890 F. Supp. 532, 537-38, 546
(W.D. La. 1995) (mem.).
155. United States v. Naftalin, 534 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1976).
156. See Cook v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1247-49 (D. Colo.
1998).
157. See id.
158. It is a "well-established principle that the [constitutional] right to counsel ... does
not extend to administrative license revocation proceedings." Plumer v. Maryland, 915
F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1990).
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proceedings.'" In a similar fashion as the principles behind the civil
rules, the Confrontation Clause has been preserved in administrative
proceedings as an implicit authority that exists in conjunction with the
right to a hearing." "The right to a hearing embraces not only the
right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know
the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to
submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be
but a barren one.",6 1 While the statutory right to counsel under the
APA is a limited right, an affected party has an inherent right to
162
confront the evidence being used by an agency.
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action
seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the
action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the
Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might
be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness,
intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these
protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in
the Sixth Amendment[,] which provides that in all criminal cases
the accused shall enjoy the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." This Court has been zealous to protect
these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal
cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative and
regulatory actions were under scrutiny.
The evidence which is used by an agency to prove an action must
be disclosed to the adverse party who is given the opportunity to
challenge it at a hearing.'" In fact, until the affected party can show
that he or she has been injured by agency action, the party may not
159. See Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Confrontation
Clause speaks only of 'all criminal prosecutions.' That constitutional right does not
[generally] apply to civil administrative matters .... "); see also Elliott v. SEC, 36 F.3d 86,
88 (11th Cir. 1994); Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1969).
160. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
161. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
162. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970) ("In almost every setting where
important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.").
163. Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
164. See Robbins v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 594 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1979).
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attempt to confront the evidence.' "A[n affected] party is [also]
entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts."'" Absent these rights, the public may otherwise be
apprehensive about an agency's decision-making process or conclude
that final agency action is disingenuous.'6 ' However, these inherent
rights do not extend to the agency's investigation; the courts have
found that neither the Sixth nor the Fifth Amendments are
undermined when an agency utilizes its subpoena power during an
investigation."
Some agencies may conduct an administrative investigation in
secrecy as though it were a criminal matter."9 The purpose of the
administrative investigation is not adjudicatory, and the resulting
prosecution is tantamount to a civil matter.o In these situations, a
party may not seek to confront the agency's investigative findings
until the agency initiates action.' It is possible, however, for agencies
165. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
[As a standing requirement f]irst, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury
in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be
"fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant[] and
not .. . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely
"speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. (citations omitted).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006).
167. See Doty v. United States, 53 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
168. See EEOC v. Univ. of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 1974).
[Tihe enforcement of administrative subpoenas rests upon showing[] that
the investigation: (a) will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (b)
that the inquiry is relevant to the purpose; (c) that the information sought is
not already in the possession of the administrative body; and (d) that the
administrative steps required by Code have been followed.
Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
169. See SEC. v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742 (1984).
[T~he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment is offended when a federal administrative
agency, without notifying a person under investigation, uses its subpoena
power to gather evidence adverse to him. The Due Process Clause is not
implicated under such circumstances because an administrative investigation
adjudicates no legal rights, and the Confrontation Clause does not come into
play until the initiation of criminal proceedings.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. See id.; see also United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425, 442 (7th Cir. 1965).
171. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446-48 (1960).
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to allow the right of confrontation during an agency investigationl72 or
for an agency to concretely show how disclosure would interfere with
enforcement proceedings.173
The history of investigations conducted by the executive
branch of the Government is ... marked by a decided absence
of . .. procedures [such as detailed notice or an opportunity to
confront, cross-examine, and call other witnesses]. The best
example is provided by the administrative regulatory agencies.
Although these agencies normally make determinations of a
quasi-judicial nature, they also frequently conduct purely fact-
finding investigations. When doing the former, they are
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and the parties
to the adjudication are accorded the traditional safeguards of a
trial. However, when these agencies are conducting
nonadjudicative, fact-finding investigations, rights such as
apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination generally do not
obtain.
A typical agency is the Federal Trade Commission. Its rules
draw a clear distinction between adjudicative proceedings and
investigative proceedings. Although the latter are frequently
initiated by complaints from undisclosed informants and
although the Commission may use the information obtained
during investigations to initiate adjudicative proceedings,
nevertheless, persons summoned to appear before investigative
proceedings are entitled only to a general notice of "the purpose
and scope of the investigation," and while they may have the
advice of counsel, "counsel may not, as a matter of right,
otherwise participate in the investigation." The reason for these
rules is obvious. The Federal Trade Commission could not
conduct an efficient investigation if persons being investigated
Another regulatory agency which distinguishes between adjudicative and
investigative proceedings is the Securities and Exchange Commission. This
Commission conducts numerous investigations, many of which are initiated
by complaints from private parties. Although the Commission's Rules
provide that parties to adjudicative proceedings shall be given detailed
notice of the matters to be determined, and a right to cross-examine
witnesses appearing at the hearing, those provisions of the Rules are made
specifically inapplicable to investigations, even though the Commission is
required to initiate civil or criminal proceedings if an investigation discloses
violations of law. Undoubtedly, the reason for this distinction is to prevent
the sterilization of investigations by burdening them with trial-like
procedures.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
172. See Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 811-12, (4th Cir. 1983).
173. See Campbell v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 261-62 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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were permitted to convert the investigation into a trial."4
The policy implication of disallowing a right of confrontation
during the investigation primarily involves maintaining the efficacy of
the process."' While a criminal violation involves a clear delineation
of certain elements that the government must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt, an administrative violation is based on enforcement
guidelines and the expertise of a governing commission or agency
designee."' This system of enforcement allows the agency to develop
coherent policies and promulgate rules that have the force of law."'
After an action is initiated, the agency is further granted deference in
interpreting its prosecuting authority.17 ' Given this deference and the
174. Hannah, 363 U.S. at 445-46 (quoting 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.33, 1.40 (1958)) (citations
omitted).
175. The Supreme Court has
explained that an administrative agency need not demonstrate "[p]robable
cause in the criminal law sense" to obtain a warrant to inspect property for
compliance with a regulatory scheme. Rather, an administrative warrant
may issue "not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on
a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
[establishment]."
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 252 n.14 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978))
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
176. See Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978).
Information gathered by the Commission under its broad investigatory
powers can be used for a variety of purposes, including promulgation of new
rules, reporting to Congress, disseminating economic knowledge to the
public, or, as here, to prepare an economic survey or report to enable the
Commission to better administer the statutes over which it has jurisdiction.
Id.
177. Dyer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1989).
Statements made by federal agencies may constitute substantive rules or
merely be general policy statements. Agencies are bound by duly
promulgated substantive rules, which have the force of law, while
interpretive rules or policy statements do not have binding effect. In order to
determine whether a particular statement is a binding rule or a general, non-
binding policy statement, courts must examine both the language of the
statement and the purpose it serves. If a pronouncement implements a
statute by enacting a legislative-type rule affecting individual rights and
obligations, it is likely to be a substantive rule. A statement is also likely to
be considered binding if it narrowly circumscribes administrative discretion
in all future cases, and if it finally and conclusively determines the issues to
which it relates. A policy statement is a pronouncement that simply advises
the public what the agency's prospective position on an issue is likely to be.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. See Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984);
see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 668, 672
(2007).
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fact that the proceeding is not treated as a criminal offense in which
an individual can invoke his or her constitutional rights, the affected
party is left at a disadvantage by the conflicting principles of civil and
criminal elements in administrative law as to when they are applied
and to what extent.
In the event a violation merely requires that the agency purport
for the record that the affected party failed to accomplish an
administrative task, a complete right of confrontation hardly creates a
burden on the system. For example, in the case of an applicant for
licensure who fails to disclose a prior criminal offense, the agency may
simply need to produce a certified copy of the judgment and sentence
at a hearing."' If, however, the violation contains a criminal element
such as fraud, the agency may require additional evidence or require
the witnesses to prove intent.'" The administrative process may
benefit by allowing the licensee access to materials during a pending
investigation if disclosure would not compromise a parallel criminal
investigation.'
Allowing access to evidence after initiating an administrative
proceeding under a statute that contains criminal elements actually
appears stronger than proceedings that are civil in nature.'g Ironically,
although the Confrontation Clause specifically applies to criminal
179. See Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1974).
180. Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
[T]he elements of [making an] intentional false statement [under a statute
that an agency administers] are the first three elements of fraud: falsity,
materiality and knowledge. Thus, intentional false statement is a lesser
included offense within fraud.. . . [F]raud requires at least one additional
element, i.e., an intent to deceive.
Id.
181. See generally United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 662 (2008).
182. See United States v. England, 347 F.2d 425, 443 (7th Cir. 1965).
"If th[e] constitutional provision (the Sixth Amendment) means anything,
one accused of a crime[,] which consists in the violation of an administrative
order[,] is entitled to a full trial on his defense that he committed no crime
because the order in question was invalid. The concepts of statutory
provisions for judicial review as exclusive and of a narrow scope of review
may be valid and valuable ones in administrative-law cases. That is true
because such cases are exclusively civil in character. They are wholly out of
place in criminal proceedings. When the criminal law is used as an auxiliary
of the administrative process, the ordinary concepts applicable in
administrative law proceeding must give way in favor of the constitutional
right of the accused to a full and fair trial. Only thus can our administrative
law be reconciled with the demands of the Sixth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law and the Sixth Amendment: "Malaise in
the Administrative Scheme", 40 A.B.A. J. 107, 166 (1954)).
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proceedings, the Supreme Court has in fact equated the non-
adjudicatory administrative investigation and determination of a
violation to a grand jury proceeding.'" An affected party, however,
may in fact benefit by being allowed to present mitigating evidence to
the body or panel charged with determining reasonable sufficiency or
probable cause. Prior to the agency making a determination whether
there is a violation, such as the determination of probable cause by an
agency officer or panel, the affected party should have the
opportunity to supplement the investigation. '" In such an event, the
investigating agency would be in a better position to utilize its
expertise prior to making a decision whether to prosecute or initiate
action, settle the action prior to adjudication, or dismiss the matter. 5
The APA provides that agency action may be considered
unlawful if it is contrary to a constitutional right.'" From the agency's
perspective, as these proceedings are not characteristically criminal in
nature nor considered a "criminal prosecution," the Sixth
Amendment does not readily apply." Courts have essentially
183. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 448-49 (1960).
[Considering] the procedures traditionally followed by executive and
legislative investigating agencies, we think it would be profitable at this point
to discuss the oldest and, perhaps, the best known of all investigative bodies,
the grand jury. It has never been considered necessary to grant a witness
summoned before the grand jury the right to refuse to testify merely because
he did not have access to the identity and testimony of prior witnesses. Nor
has it ever been considered essential that a person being investigated by the
grand jury be permitted to come before that body and cross-examine
witnesses who may have accused him of wrongdoing.
Undoubtedly,... procedural rights . . . have not been extended to grand jury
hearings because of the disruptive influence their injection would have on
the proceedings, and also because the grand jury merely investigates and
reports. It does not try.
We think it is fairly clear from this survey of various phases of
governmental investigation that witnesses appearing before investigating
agencies, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, have generally not been
accorded the rights of apprisal, confrontation, or cross-examination.
Although we do not suggest that the grand jury and the congressional
investigating committee are identical in all respects to the ... executive
agencies and commissions created by Congress, [we mention them] to show
that the rules of this Commission are not alien to those which have
historically governed the procedure of investigations conducted by agencies
in the three major branches of our Government.
Id.
184. See Fore Way Express, Inc. v. State of Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 660 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1987).
185. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 646 (2003).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(b) (2006).
187. Agee v. Baker, 753 F. Supp. 373, 385 n.13 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The Sixth Amendment
claim can be easily dismissed, as the amendment on its face applies only in 'criminal
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interpreted the application of an individual's Sixth Amendment rights,
like the Fifth, in a specific fashion during the proceeding.'8 Affected
parties, such as licensees and permit holders, may be unaware of these
distinctions during a challenge to agency action, irrespective of
whether the proceeding is considered quasi-criminal or civil in
nature."9 These rights should be re-examined to provide the parties
with full notice, not just notice of the impending action, and to allow
absolute access to the process, not simply access to a hearing.
V. AN ADMINISTRATIVE BILL OF RIGHTS: INVESTIGATION, TRIAL
& SENTENCE
The Bill of Rights was written to ensure the protection of civil
liberties against fundamental aspects of government intrusion at a
time when administrative agencies were not prolific.'" The
administrative process is a quagmire of legal concepts bridged
together by a common theme-to regulate and adjudicate for the
benefit of the public."'9 The uniqueness of this system has allowed for
prosecutions' .... ).
188. See Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 1995); Roach v. NTSB, 804
F.2d 1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1986).
189. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1938).
Remedial sanctions may be of varying types. One which is
characteristically free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a
privilege voluntarily granted.
... In spite of their comparative severity, such sanctions have been
upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject
to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154.
190. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 266-67 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Although opponents of the Bill of Rights "felt sure that the spirit of liberty
could be trusted[] and that its ideals would be represented, not debased, by
legislation," the Framers disagreed:
. . . Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they
insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse.... With power in
a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the
actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with
what accompaniments they might, what more potent instrument of
cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed that
power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the
clause ....
... [T]his "restraint upon legislatures" possesses an "expansive and vital
character" that is "'essential ... to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom."'
Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73, 376-77 (1910)) (citations
omitted).
191. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1985)
("In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that
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a limited interpretation of certain constitutional rights at the complete
alienation of others.
An example of a constitutional right that has not been limited is
the First Amendment. For instance, the right to petition an agency to
take official action has been fully preserved in a proceeding.'" To a
licensee, this means that "the First Amendment[] require[s] ... a
licensing scheme [to] assure prompt judicial review of an
administrative decision denying a license.""' The Supreme Court has
further declared that a First Amendment violation may occur "where
the licensing scheme vests unbridled discretion in the decisionmaker
and where the regulation is challenged as overbroad[,] . . . [or] where a
scheme creates a risk of delay, such that every application of the
statute create[s] an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas . . . ."9
As such, the First Amendment came to be given serious consideration
with regard to delegated authority.'
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the rights embodied in the
Seventh Amendment are generally excluded from administrative
when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be
conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of
encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 1990).
192. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of them to
administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature and arms
of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly
the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right
of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.
Id.; see alo Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. S.F. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976).
193. City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 776 (2004).
194. Paris Adult Bookstore II v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1990) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 520 (1946) ("Certainly[, absent any security
reasons,] neither Congress nor [flederal agencies acting pursuant to [clongressional
authorization may abridge the freedom of press and religion safeguarded by the First
Amendment."); but see Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a
more limited application of the First Amendment in relation to public employees). The
First Amendment protection of public employees' testimony is not absolute.
There are instances in which government entities' interests as employers
outweigh employees' interests in free expression and the policy of
encouraging truthful and uninhibited testimony.... A public employee's
testimony may impair discipline by supervisors or harmony among
coworkers; it may undermine close working relationships based on loyalty
and confidence; it may impede the performance of an employee's duties or
the regular operations of the enterprise.
Id. (citations omitted).
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procedure.'" This is simply because jury trials were not integrated into
the statutorily created adjudicatory process of the APA.'w In a system
dominated by administrative law judges and hearing officials, the
process simply does not seem, on its face, to require an application of
the Seventh Amendment because administrative cases do not arise
under the common law. "[T]he Seventh Amendment is generally
inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be
incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication
and would substantially interfere with the [agency's] role in the
statutory scheme."'
To understand the basis for this exclusion, it is important to look
at the reasoning of the Supreme Court. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, the Court stated that a jury trial should be utilized when
the cause of action is legal in nature and involves a matter of "private"
rather than "public" right.m In the event Congress delegates its
authority to an agency for a public purpose, the Seventh Amendment
does not entitle the parties to a jury trial.201 A public right is one in
which "the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an
otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights." 202 Private
rights, on the other hand, are generally "private tort, contract, and
property cases." 203 For the Court, the interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment with respect to the APA was strictly a legal analysis
regarding the forum through which a dispute is resolved.2 4 This did
not, however, impair Congress from creating and vesting new rights in
administrative agencies similar to those preserved under the Seventh
Amendment. 205
The Seventh Amendment was declaratory of the existing law,
for it required only that jury trial in suits at common law was to
196. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1989) (discussing that
Congress cannot subvert citizens' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by merely
assigning the adjudication of disputes through administrative agencies).
197. However, "the Seventh Amendment does not entitle the parties to a jury trial if
Congress assigns its adjudication to an administrative agency or specialized court of
equity." Id. at 42 n.4.
198. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII; see also 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006) (discussing the
appointment of administrative law judges).
199. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (footnote omitted).
200. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 460-61 (1977).
205. See id.
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be "preserved." It thus did not purport to require a jury trial
where none was required before....
The point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended
to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding
in civil cases. It took the existing legal order as it found it, and
there is little or no basis for concluding that the Amendment
should now be interpreted to provide an impenetrable barrier to
administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal
regulatory statutes. [The Court could not] conclude that the
Amendment rendered Congress powerless-when it concluded
that remedies available in courts of law were inadequate to cope
with a problem within Congress' power to regulate-to create
new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their
enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law-
such as an administrative agency-in which facts are not found
by juries.2 0
Fundamentally, as long as the agency is clear in its enforcement
regulations and its adjudicatory process meets due process
requirements, it can preserve the spirit of the Seventh Amendment.20
As previously noted, an agency utilizes its expertise in determining
whether an affected party's actions violated a particular regulation,
and its interpretation of the regulation is afforded deference. 208 For
instance, by utilizing this expertise, it can define and regulate
unlicensed activity for a particular profession without serious concern
whether the agency action violates constitutional principles, as long as
it is acting under its specific delegated authority.2" The more the
206. Id. at 459-60.
207. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
The call for the true application of the Seventh Amendment is not to words,
but to the spirit of honest desire to see that constitutional right preserved.
Either the judge or the jury must decide facts and, to the extent that we take
this responsibility, we lessen the jury function. Our duty to preserve this one
of the Bill of Rights may be peculiarly difficult, for here it is our own power
[that] we must restrain. We should not fail to meet the expectation of James
Madison, who, in advocating the adoption of the Bill of Rights, said:
"Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; ... they will be naturally led to resist
every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution
by the declaration of right."
Id.
208. See Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment v. U.S. Dep't of
Housing, 406 F. Supp. 1024, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (mem.).
209. See Wang v. Pataki, 396 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
"[G]ovemmental action constitutes a prior restraint when it is directed to
suppressing speech because of its content before the speech is
communicated." [In a case where a state has revoked a real estate broker's
[Vol. 51:369404
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agency clearly defines unlicensed activity, the more likely its actions
may fall under its defined authority.210 In the event an agency files an
unlicensed cease and desist order against a licensee for action that
could otherwise be constitutionally protected, the agency may
arguably be acting beyond its delegated authority.211
Avoiding such situations could preserve the spirit of the Seventh
Amendment in the following ways. First, like the Sixth Amendment,
an affected party should have an opportunity to supplement the
investigative file to provide evidence to the presiding panel with
policy and business practice changes from the regulated industry. As
an expert entity, an agency can be both the guardian of the regulated
public and a rights-protector of the affected party in order to ensure
an independent decision. For agencies that may have imbued policy
considerations into the development of its rules or interpretation of
delegated authority, it is arguable whether a fact-finder may be in a
position to fully understand these concepts without clearly defined
instructions.212
Second, during the proceeding, an agency should provide
license, it] has not suppressed speech before it is communicated but rather
revoked [the licensure due to] unlicensed operation[, which] demonstratels]
untrustworthiness.
The State of New York may, consistent with the United States
Constitution, require licensure to engage in numerous professions, including
acting as a real estate broker. Under [a contrary] theory, any adverse action
taken based on a person's unlicensed practice of a profession would be
transformed into a "prior restraint," and the State would have to overcome
the "heavy presumption against.. constitutional validity" that attaches to
such restraints.
Id. at 455 (quoting N.Y. State Ass'n of Career Schools v. State Educ. Dep't, 823 F. Supp.
1096, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)) (citations omitted).
210. See id. at 451.
211. See id.
212. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Chadwick's of Boston, Ltd., No. 93-11240-REK,
1995 WL 706126, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 1995).
Nineteenth and twentieth century developments in the United States have
created new kinds of mixed-legal-factual issues that were unknown in the
common law legal tradition. (a) The degree of intertwining of fact, law, and
policy choices underlying lawmaking by legislatures and courts in the field of
administrative law, including judicial review of agency decisions, has created
issues unknown in the common law tradition before adoption of the Sixth
and Seventh Amendments. (b) Among such issues are some that involve
such extreme intermingling of factual, legal, and policy choices underlying
lawmaking that disentanglement of factual issues so a jury could be clearly
instructed on the applicable law and could function as the final
decisionmakers by verdict would be extraordinarily difficult, if not
impossible.
Id.
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evidence of policy considerations to an administrative law judge, such
that the decision rendered is not easily overturned by the agency. To
this end, a major hurdle that needs to be resolved is the agency's
authority over an administrative law judge's recommended order.
Although an affected party may provide a judge with evidence
contradicting an agency's policy consideration, some "administrative
agenc[ies have] the ultimate authority to adopt, reject or modify an
[administrative law judge's] recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law."213 With such authority, an agency may pronounce
a version of the facts which is different from the administrative law
judge's decision, as long as it is based on an interpretation that is
reasonably defensible and based on substantial evidence.214 Even the
appellate court may not be able to overturn such an agency decision
unless it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion"
or one of the other standards of judicial review under the APA.215
In effect, an administrative law judge may solely determine a
finding of fact based on the credibility of a witness or an assessment of
the evidence.216 The agency's decision, however, may otherwise
contradict such findings, even when a judge does not find a regulatory
violation.217 Currently, an agency's final order is given deference as
long as a reasonable mind might accept the conclusion reached by the
agency.218 Creating a mechanism to balance the interest of the affected
party with that of the agency, such as a uniform review of standards
and procedures,219 may better serve the spirit of the Seventh
213. Latessa v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 113 F.3d 1313, 1317 (3d Cir. 1997); see, e.g.,
Cousin v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 73 F.3d 1242, 1249 (2d Cir. 1996).
214. See Multimax, Inc. v. FAA, 231 F.3d 882,887 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
215. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
216. Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266 (1987) (plurality opinion)
("Final assessments of the credibility of supporting witnesses are appropriately reserved
for the administrative law judge, before whom an opportunity for complete cross-
examination of opposing witnesses is provided."); see also BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 526-27 (2002).
217. See Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 211 (8th Cir. 1984).
218. Howard v. FAA, 17 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A review for 'substantial
evidence' is one undertaken with some deference. Under this standard, a finding will not
be disturbed if supported by 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."' (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938))). For example, "[w]here either one of two inferences may reasonably be
drawn from undisputed facts, the inference adopted by the agency or board whose duty it
is to draw the inference from which it is to formulate its judgment may not be disturbed on
appeal." Nw. Bancorporation v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 303 F.2d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 1962). "[D]e
novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an
adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain
administrative actions." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam).
219. A court may normally review an agency's final order to determine whether the
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Amendment.
The purpose of the APA, as noted in its legislative history, was to
provide a fair administrative procedure-an administrative bill of
rights-to protect those whose affairs are controlled or regulated by
agencies of the Federal Government; while the Act was not intended
to unduly restrict the government, it was intended to reasonably
protect private parties, even if that resulted in a change to established
administrative operations.220 Given this reasoning, some of the
inconsistencies between the Bill of Rights and administrative law
could be remedied through codification in the APA, possibly as a
separate APA bill of rights.221 These codified rights could incorporate
the other provisions mentioned in this Article, not merely according
to court decisions, but specific rights that protect affected parties by
informing them of their rights. The purpose of codifying an APA bill
of rights would not only provide affected parties the opportunity for
redress, but it would also preserve the entire constitutional framework
of rights rather than resorting to a fragmented version developed by
different agencies and courts over time.222
Rather than attempting to incorporate the constitutional
amendments into administrative proceedings, due to the peculiar
nature of administrative law, a statutory bill of rights could work in
conjunction with the court's rulings. Such an application of the APA
can be equated to a specific delegation of authority over all types of
administrative proceedings by every federal agency. For instance, this
agency action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or
unsupported by substantial evidence. See generally JSG Trading Corp. v. USDA, 176 F.3d
536 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
220. Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1991).
221. See id. (discussing the APA's purpose of improving agency administration as a
type of bill of rights for those regulated by federal agencies).
222. See Jinks v. Mays, 464 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1972).
In this day and age public agencies adopt, sometimes in the utmost good
faith, regulations which are considered necessary and in the best interest of
the program which they administer, little realizing that at some later date the
courts, with the advantage of hindsight, will declare their handiwork
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the past several years legal thought regarding laws and regulations affecting
individual rights and liberties have changed rapidly; that which was
permissible a few years ago is no longer acceptable; the Bill of Rights has
indeed become a living Bill of Rights. This fluid situation makes it inevitable
that governmental bodies will sometimes run afoul of modern constitutional
requirements. When this occurs, assuming the absence of bad faith and
discriminatory purpose, full justice can usually be accomplished through the
application of time tested legal and equitable remedies without resorting to
drastic prophylactic measures designed . .. to deter future conduct ....
Id.
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bill could specify that a licensee does not hold a right against self-
incrimination with regard to business records. In this sense, it could
also delineate how agencies must place individuals on notice that
documents or records obtained under an investigative subpoena or
collected as part of a reporting requirement may be used against
them.m A statutory bill of rights could further codify the true meaning
of the right to counsel or that the right to cross-examine witnesses is
applicable upon completion of an investigation but before the
commencement of a prosecution. For certain types of administrative
violations, the statutory bill of rights could also provide access to a
probable cause official and investigative evidence.
The notion of such a statutory bill of rights is an expansion of the
original intent of the APA and a more stringent set of rights beyond
simply codifying due process; it is a notion that could specify when the
rights of the affected party are paramount to those of the
government.24  For example, the application of the Fourth
Amendment in administrative proceedings could be an important and
necessary codification. The Supreme Court has already held that a
"violation of the Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the
Constitution," thereby curtailing an individual's right against an
unreasonable search25 In this context, an agency's subpoena power
seems not to infringe on the Fourth Amendment if the agency's
inquiry is within the agency's authority, is not too indefinite, and is
reasonably relevant.226
Unless it is unduly burdensome to the affected party's business or
223. But cf. supra text accompanying note 58.
224. See, e.g., Mower v. Britton, 504 F.2d 396, 398-99 (10th Cir. 1974) (discussing an
inmate's rights as paramount to the parole board's decision, which fell under the APA).
225. See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362 (1998).
[A] Fourth Amendment violation is fully accomplished by the illegal search
or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or administrative
proceeding can cure the invasion of the defendant's rights[,] which he has
already suffered. The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means
of deterring illegal searches and seizures. As such, the rule does not
proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or
against all persons, but applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served. Moreover, because the rule is
prudential rather than constitutionally mandated ... it [is] applicable only
where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.
Id. at 362-63 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.632, 652 (1950); see, e.g., New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (finding that a warrantless inspection of a commercial
premises was reasonable because the privacy interest of the owner was weakened-
because the industry was closely regulated-and the governmental interest in regulation
was heightened).
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professional practice, courts are very reluctant to invalidate an
agency-issued investigatory subpoena.227 Under this logic, evidence
illegally obtained may not necessarily be excluded in an administrative
proceeding. For example, in Pennsylvania Board of Probation &
Parole v. Scott, the Court notes that the exclusionary rule is judicially
created and that it is "applicable only where its deterrence benefits
outweigh its 'substantial social costs."' 2" As such, it does not readily
apply in administrative proceedings to exclude evidence.229
Applying a variation of the exclusionary rule in administrative
proceedings may result in deterring agencies from obtaining evidence
illegally, thus holding them to higher standard of investigatory
techniques and reporting requirements. 23 0 Arguably, the concerns over
a stricter requirement may benefit the public "where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 2 1 Irrespective of the
reasonableness of an agency investigation, the spirit of the Bill of
Rights should be preserved in an administrative law context, such as
when individuals apply for licenses or appeal to agencies for authority
to perform a regulated function.
An administrative bill of rights could ultimately ensure that an
affected party's rights are strictly applied by the courts in an
adjudicatory proceeding. This could practically be accomplished by
providing a written notice to the affected party in a similar fashion as
previously discussed with the Miranda warning.232 A bill of rights may
also be beneficial when a court is reluctant to apply the Eighth
Amendment because the court incorrectly requires a punitive, almost
criminal, aspect to the excessive punishment standard.233 In the Eighth
227. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. FTC, 595 F.2d 685, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
228. 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907
(1984)).
229. See id.
230. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). In Wong Sun, the
Supreme Court stated that there was no need to
hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would
not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
Id. (quoting John MacArthur Maguire, Evidence of Guilt: Restrictions Upon Its Discovery
or Compulsory Disclosure 221(F.B. Rothman 1982) (1959)).
231. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see also United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1994).
232. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
233. See Nat'l Taxpayers Union v. U.S. Social Sec. Admin., 302 F. App'x 115, 120 (3d
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 361 (2009) (finding that a penalty imposed by an agency
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Amendment context, the prohibition against excessive penalties,
however, is mainly a question of whether a sentence or fine is grossly
disproportionate to the violation or offense.23 4 It is clear that the
Eighth Amendment "protects against excessive civil fines, including
forfeitures."" As such, it could have a strong application during the
administrative proceeding prior to a judicial standard of review.236
The primary issue regarding penalties in an administrative
proceeding is whether the agency has the delegated authority to
impose the specific penalty." A reviewing court, therefore, should not
disturb an administrative sentence as long it was imposed by the
agency within the permissible range of its delegated authority.238 An
agency may utilize guidelines to determine the type of sanction to
impose after a proceeding. 239 These types of guidelines could be
promulgated by every agency if they were so required under the APA
in order to delineate the specific criteria for punishing an affected
party, rather than merely resting on the fact that the punishment falls
within the agency's general authority. The APA could also require
that the agency promulgate routine adjustments to the guidelines,
taking into account policy changes and any revision or finalization of
agency decisions.
Finally, an administrative bill of rights in the adjudicatory arena
could also elevate the notification rights of an affected party to the
level that is required under the rule-promulgation and regulatory
aspects of an agency.240 For the most part, the basis of a rule regulating
was not punishment, excessive, or a fine under the Eighth Amendment).
234. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) ("The Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." (quoting Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983))); see also Balice v. USDA, 203 F.3d 684, 698 (9th Cir.
2000) (discussing the Eight Amendment's applicability in a civil fine context).
235. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997).
236. See supra text accompanying note 219.
237. "No matter how excessive (in lay terms) an administrative fine may appear, if the
fine does not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it, the fine does not
violate the Eighth Amendment." Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir.
2000).
238. See id.
239. See, e.g., Pharaon v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 135 F.3d 148, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(discussing that an agency may either use or depart from an established penalty guideline).
240. See Safe Air for Everyone v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the current notice system under the APA).
[T]he notice requirements of the APA . .. require[] that some indication of
the regulatory intent that overcomes plain language must be referenced in
the published notices that accompanied the rulemaking process. Otherwise,
interested parties would not have the meaningful opportunity to comment
on proposed regulations that the APA contemplates because they would
[Vol. 51:369410
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a practice or enforcement of an agency order through adjudication
must be clearly discernable.24 1
In order to infuse a measure of public accountability into
administrative practices, the APA mandates that agencies
provide interested parties notice and an opportunity for
comment before promulgating rules of general applicability.
This right to participate in the rulemaking process can be
meaningfully exercised, however, only if the public can
understand proposed rules as meaning what they appear to
242
say.
This same principle, however, has not been applied to the formal
or informal adjudicatory process.
The terminology for hearings under the APA can be imprecise
and confusing. The everyday meaning of terms like "formal"
and "informal" sometimes creeps into the discussion, although
those terms have specific, functional definitions under the
APA..... Other terms, too, are sometimes used to refer to such
procedures-"trial-type" and "quasi-judicial." These vague and
indefinite terms are particularly mischievous because they evoke
images of courtroom trials, and they have contributed to the
false impression that the APA's requirement of on-the-record
hearings involves procedures more akin to civil trials than is
241
actually the case.
The administrative structure as a whole was created to serve the
public and to regulate efficiently without uncertainty.2" The rights of
an affected party at any stage, therefore, should be clear, rather than
clouded or confusing to the general public.2 45 While the administrative
function governs the privilege to practice a profession or enter a
regulated field, the protection of the public should not encourage a
disambiguation between an application of the Bill of Rights in the
criminal or civil realm and the administrative arena. An individual
who lacks knowledge of the administrative process should know how
his or her rights are truly affected without having to resort to, or rely
have had no way of knowing what was actually proposed.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
241. See id. at 1105.
242. Id. at 1106.
243. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 356 (1st Cir.
2004).
244. However, "[r]econciling the need for efficient regulatory adjudication with
fairness to the parties and due concern for the public interest is a different, and difficult,
problem." Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 326, 362
(1967).
245. See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., 391 F.3d at 356.
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on, prior experience or outside sources of information.
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